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NOTICE UNDER ARTICLE 36:
THE VIENNA CONVENTION DILEMMA
Linda Holshouser'
INTRODUCTION
This note will provide an overview of the controversy
surrounding the failure of United States authorities to observe the
notice provision of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (hereinafter "VCCR"). Part I will discuss the VCCR and the
entities that interpret it. Part II will examine the apparently conflicting
views on this topic of the United States Supreme Court and the
International Court of Justice (hereinafter "ICJ") through the cases
those courts have considered. Part III will identify the problems
inherent in rectifying the failure and recommend solutions.
BACKGROUND
In 1963, the United States signed the VCCR, a multilateral treaty
aimed at "[ensuring] the efficient performance of functions by consular
posts on behalf of their respective States.'" Under Article 36 of the
VeeR, when authorities of one member nation detain a foreign
national belonging to another member nation, those authorities must
allow the detainee to contact and communicate with his consulate. 2 In
addition, they must allow his consulate free access to, and
communication with, the detainee. ] In the words of Article 36, "[t]he
said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights. ,,4
On its face, the VCCR appears to have created individual rights
for a foreign national -the rights to contact his consulate, communicate
• J.D. Candidate, University of South Carolina School of Law, 2007.
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1 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963,21 U.S.T. 77,
77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter VCCR].
]: Id. at art. 36.
] !d.
4 Jd.
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with his consulate, and perhaps most importantly, the right to receive
notice of these rights from his custodians. Additionally, States appear
to have rights of access and communication under the VeeR in regards
to their citizens who are in custody within another State. However, if
these rights exist, it appears that United States authorities observe them
more often in the breach. Decisions from United States federal courts
indicate, at best, confusion in applying Article 36 and, at worst, a total
disregard of its provisions.' Opinions by the Supreme Court itself have
interpreted VCCR Article 36 as a toothless and non-binding agreement,
enabling the United States to incarcerate and execute foreign nationals
without notifying their consulates.
Forty-three years after the creation of the Vienna Convention,
cases arising under its notice provision are numerous in both state and
federal courts. The majority of these cases have arisen within the last
decade. This paper will focus on apparent conflicts in interpretation
between recent opinions from the United States Supreme Court and
opinions of the ICl
Treaties as Part ofthe 'Supreme Law ofthe Land'
The United States Constitution proclaims:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. 6
By this clause, the Constitution incorporates international treaties into
the "supreme Law of the Land," binding not only the federal
authorities, but also the individual legal system of every State in the
Union to honor the treaties' provisions. The precise point at which a
treaty assumes this strength, however, is less clear. Through the years,
the Supreme Court has developed a distinction between treaties that are
"self·executing" and "non-self-executing" - treaties that, on the one
hand, become law immediately through operation of their provisions,
and treaties that, on the other hand, only reach "supreme Law" status
5 Compare Jog; v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an
implied private right of action in tort to recover for Article 36 violation), with
Ramirez Cardenas v. Drctkc, 405 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2005), available at 2005
WL 705049 (recognizing no private right to confer with consulate).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
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after Congress has enacted additional domestic laws to trigger their
obligations and protections. 7 In drawing this rather indistinct line, the
Supreme Court approached treaties as contracts between countries, with
the legislature entering the contract on behalf of the United States.'
Generally speaking l treaties functioning as contracts tor performance
required additional congressional action before the Court would regard
them as law.'
Not only is the power to enter treaties restricted to federal
authorities,'O but the power to modify their provisions is limited as
well. Over the years, the comparatively static treaty law proved
somewhat inflexible and impractical alongside the more flexible
domestic law. In 1957, the Supreme Court affirmed its longstanding
opinion that while the executive branch may bind the country by treaty,
the legislative branch has the authority to alter the domestic impact of
treaty obligations by enacting statutes that supersede specific
provisions within the treaties. II Thus, Congress needs only enact a
statute to "line-out" or revise the domestic law concerning a treaty
provision that proved unwieldy, outdated, or unpopular. However, the
Court limited this power to the federal government only: "[a] treaty
cannot be the supreme law of the land . . . if any act of a State
Legislature can stand in its way." 12
When treaty provisions and domestic laws conflict, the Supreme
Court reviews the two together and looks for ways to reconcile them.
If reconciling the two proves impossible, the more recent provision will
prevail:
[T]he courts will always endeavor to construe them so as
to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating
the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the
one last in date will control the other, provided always the
stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. 13
7 Jordan 1. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. 1. INTtL L. 760, 772
(1988).
'Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.s. 253 (2 Pet.) 314 (1829).
9 ld.
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 and art. I, § 10.
" Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 18, n.34 (1957) (citing Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
12 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,236 (1795).
13 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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The United States recognizes the VCCR, entered into in 1963 by
over a hundred nations and ratified by the United States in 1969, as a
self-executing treaty. 14 As such, its provisions need not be individually
enacted into United States law to be effective. The VCCR endeavors to
trcontribute to the development of friendly relations among nations,
irrespective of their dillering constitutional and social systems" by
establishing certain norms that would facilitate consular functions. 15
The VCCR also includes an Optional Protocol on dispute resolution
that places compulsory jurisdiction over disputes with the lCJ. 16 The
United States initially subscribed to the Optional Protocol but withdrew
its support in 2005. 17
The Courts
The United States Supreme Court has issued opinions denying
certiorari in two cases involving parties to IeJ suits 18 and has
considered one case arising under VCCR Article 36. 19 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in two cases involving notice under VeeR,
with oral arguments presented on March 29, 2006, and decisions
anticipated within a few months. 20 State and federal courts have
resolved the remaining cases.
As the judicial branch of the United Nations and the forum that
resolves VCCR disputes among member nations, the ICJ has heard
complaints against the United States under Article 36 of the VCCR on
three occasions for alleged violations extending back as far as 1982."
14 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
15 VeeR, supra note I.
16 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
art. I, Apr. 24, 1963,21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
17 Adam Liptak, u.s. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body,
N.Y. TtMES, Mar. 10,2005, at A16, available at 2005 WL 3685583.
IS Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (denying certiorari, companion
case is VCCR-Breard); Torres v, Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (Stevens, J.);
Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (Breyer, I., dissenting).
19 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
20 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 108 P.3d 573 (Ore. 200), cert. granted, 126
S.Ct. 620 (2005) (Mem) (No. 04-10566) and Bustillo v. Johnson, 65 Va. Cir. 69
(2004), cerl. granted, 126 S.Ct. 621 (2005) (No. 05-51).
" See LaGrand Case (F.R.G v. U.s), 2001 I.C.!. 466 (Jonc 21) available
at 2001 WL 34607609; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.s), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10), availahle al 1998 WL 1180014 [hereinafter
2006J ARTICLE 36: VIENNA CONVENTION DILEMA 103
The IC] has the authority to decide questions of international law
between or among member nations. 22 However, its decisions are
binding only upon the parties and only within the context of the case at
bar. 23 IC./ decisions may convey the Court's attitude toward a
particular issue, but they have no precedential authority. 24
Treaty interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties
Treaties represent a point of tension between international law,
over which each sovereign State has very limited control, and domestic
law, over which each sovereign State has total control. While the
Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to interpret treaties to which
the United States is a party, and the Optional Protocol authorizes the
IC] to resolve disputes under the VCCR, both courts would likely look
to certain nonns of international law in construing the VeeR.
Although not actually in force for the United States, both courts would
likely look to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT")
for guidance. 25 The VCLT represents years of work by the United
Nations's International Law Commission26 and "purports to constitute
a comprehensive set of principles and rules governing all the most
significant aspect so the law of treaties.,,27 The yeLT itself is not
retroactive, applying only to treaties that came after it/8 and for this
reason would not automatically apply to the earlier-signed VCCR.
However, the usefulness of the VCLT lies in the fact that many of the
VCCR-Breard Ill; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (March 31) available at 2004 WL 2450913.
22 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, supra note 16; see also http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwv.rw/igeneralinfonn
ation/ibbookIBbookframepage.htm.
ZJ http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwv.rw/igeneralinfonnationiibbookIBbookframe
page.htm (follow "The Decision" hyperlink; then scroll to "A Judgment is
Binding on the Parties").
24 /d.
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, ] 155
V,N,T.S. 336. This treaty is not in force for the United States.
26 SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1
(2nd ed., Manchester University Press 1984) (1979).
27 [d. at 5.
2.'! [d. at 6.
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standards it codified derive from centuries of customary international
law and would apply even in the absence of the VCLT. 29
HtSTORY AND COURT DECIStONS
Criminal defendants from foreign nations have complained
bitterly that, despite the VCCR's provisions, United States officials
failed to advise them of their rights to consular contact and
communication. Because they did not know of their rights, they failed
to assert them in a timely manner during their court cases. Each case
has hinged on the United States officials' failure to perform under the
notice provision of the treaty: the authorities' failure to give notice of
the rights to contact and communication effectively precluded the
exercise of those rights. The controversy resides in how to weigh the
notice issue when a defendant first raises it in his federal habeas corpus
petition, well after the lower courts have decided the defendant's fate:
is a defendant who fails to raise the notice issue timely procedurally
barred from raising it in a petition for post-conviction relief?
The first two cases trekked through the federal court system and
the IC] during roughly the same time period. Although the crime
underlying LaGrand predated the Breard crime by ten years, the courts
disposed of the Breard case first.
Breard/Paraguay: Procedural Default and Prejudice
In 1998, the Supreme Court found that a defendant who failed to
assert a claim under the VCCR during his criminal trial procedurally
defaulted on that claim. 30 In a case with a now-familiar sequence of
events, Angel Francisco Breard l a Paraguayan national convicted of a
1992 rape and capital murder in Virginia, filed for federal habeas relief
after Virrinia affinned his conviction and denied his state habeas
petition. 3 Breard first alleged a VCCR violation in his federal habeas
petition. 32 Concurrently with that petition, the Republic of Paraguay
filed a companion suit in federal court against Virginia officials for
alleged violations of Breard's rights under the VCCR." The District
Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and
29 Customary international law refers to the common customs and
practices that developed over the course of centuries of interaction among
nations. These practices were usually not codified. ld. at 2.
30 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
II Jd. at 372-73.
32 1d. at 373.
J3 ld. at 374.
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Paraguay filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court. 34 Considering Paraguay's and Breard's petitions together, the
Supreme Court denied both. 35
Before turning to the parties' arguments, the Court found that it
was "clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under
the Vienna Convention by failing to raise that claim in the state
courts. ,.36 Paraguay and Breard argued that, as a treaty was part of the
"supreme Law of the Land" under the Constitution,37 the VeeR
"trump[ed] the procedural default doctrine."" Upon reviewing this
argument, the Court pointed out that, unless a treaty specifically
provided otherwise, intemationallaw properly required application of
the forum State's procedural rules.'9 Applying the procedural rules of
the United States, the Court found that the trump claim was "plainly
incorrect,,,40 as well-established federal law ftrovided that constitutional
claims were subject to procedural default. I However, applying the
procedural default doctrine here effectively resulted in circular logic:
Breard's claim of lack of notice failed as a result of his lack of notice.
In addition, the Court denied certiorari in Paraguay's collateral suit
because the nation lacked standing to sue for the violations under
applicable federal laws. "
Although Breard lost his petition because of procedural default,
the Court went on to nole that a successful petition would have to prove
lhat any violation of the VCCR had had a prejudicial effect on the
defendant's criminal trial. ,-' In a brief paragraph tinged with what may
be guilt. the Court also placed its own authority in perspective while
suggesting that Breard might obtain a more favorable outcome from the
executive rather than lhe judicial branch of government. The Court
proposed that the President might choose to intervene and handle the
matter with Paraguay directly, or that the Governor of Virginia might
choose to stay Breard's execution. 44 Colored by guilt or not, these
34 Id.
35 !d. at 378-79.
36 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
37 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
"523 U.S. at 371.
39 ld.
40 [d.
41 !d. at 376.
42 Jd. at 378.
43 Jd. at 376.
44 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
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suggestions ring hollow, given that the opinion opens by noting that
Breard's execution was slated for that very evening. 45
During the pendency of these actions, Paraguay also filed a
complaint against the United States with the IC] alleging violations of
the VCCR. 46 At Paraguay's request, the IC] issued a provisional order
instructing the United States to refrain from executing Breard on the
basis ofa procedural default." Virginia executed him, notwithstanding
the IC]'s provisional order. Subsequently, both Paraguay and the
United States abandoned the suit. The IC] discontinued the matter
without issuing a final opinion.48
LaGrand/Germany: Defendants Unsure of their Nationality and
Courts in Conjlict
Ten years before Breard's crime, in 1982, United States
authorities arrested and charged brothers Waiter and Karl LaGrand with
attempted armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder in connection with a
bank robbery.49 The LaGrand brothers, who were born in Germany,
had been adopted as small children by United States citizens and had
lived almost exclusively in the United States.50 They had never
pursued United States nationality, and at least one of them appeared
unaware that he held German citizenship." Upon arrest, Waiter
LaGrand affirmed that he was a United States citizen. "
Arizona courts tried and convicted the LaGrand brothers and
sentenced them to death. 53 At no time during their criminal trials or in
their first two petitions for post conviction relief did the LaGrands
assert a VCCR violation. 54 However, upon learning of their nationality
and of the VCCR's provisions from a non-governmental source, the
45 Id. at 372.
46 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.e.J 248, 249 (April
9).
" ld. at 258.
46 VCCR-Breard II, 1998 I.C.J. at 427.
49 State v. LaOrand, 734. P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987) (as to Walter), State
v. LaOrand. 733 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Ariz. 19R7) (as to Karl).
50 LaOrand Case (FRO v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 474-75 (June 27).
" ld at 476.
52 Id.
53 734 P.2d at 565, 733 P.2d at 1067.
54 LaGrand Case. 2001 I.C.J. at 476-77.
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LaGrands filed federal habeas petitions alleging VCCR violations. 55
Their petitions were dismissed. 56 The LaGrands, like Breard before
them, lost their petitions on the basis of procedural default. 57
Arizona executed Karl LaGrand on February 24, 1999." In
early March 1999, in response to Gennany's request for assistance, the
ICJ issued a provisional order instructing the United States to refrain
from executing Walter LaGrand until it issued a final judgment with
regard to the VCCR violations." However, in March 1999, Arizona
executed Walter LaGrand. 60
Unlike Paraguay, Germany continued to pursue its complaint
with the ICJ against the United States after the defendants' deaths. On
June 27, 2001, more than two years after the LaGrands' deaths, the ICJ
issued a judgment that noted, amon!, other things, that ICJ "provisional
measures ... have binding effect" I The Court concluded that while
the United States government may have facially complied with the
order by transmitting it to the Governor of the State of Arizona, the
United States did not fully comply because it did not "take all measures
at its disposar' to avoid the executions. 62 Despite findings that the
United States had breached its obligations under both the VCCR and
the IC]'s provisional order, the ICJ imposed no sanctions or obligations
on the United States. 63 Rather, the Court noted its satisfaction with the
United States' commitment to comply with the VCCR in the future and
to provide detailed descriptions of its ongoing efforts to ensure that
officials were aware of the treaty's provisions. 64 However, the Court
cautioned that should another German national suffer the same
procedural default as the LaGrand brothers, apologies from the United
States would be insufficient to alone for its breach.65
55 LaGrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158,1161 (9th Cir. 1998) (as to Karl);
LaGrand V. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (as to Karl and
Walter).
56 170 F.3d at 1161; 133 F.3d at 1277.
57 170 F.3d at 1161; 133 F.3d at 1261.
"LaGrand Case (F.R.G V. U.S.), 1999 I.C.!. 9, 11 (Mar. 3).
59 [d. at 16.
60 LaGrand Case, 2001 I.e.!. at 478.
61 [d. at 506.
62 Id. at 507.
"[d. at 515-16.
64 [d. at 516.
6S Id.
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A third group of actors played out the procedural default script in
2003. During that year, the Supreme Court denied the petition for
certiorari from a Mexican national convicted of a 1993 murder in
Oklahoma,66 and Mexico filed its own complaint against the United
States with the leJ. 67 On this occasion, however, two Supreme Court
Justices issued separate opinions concerning the Court's denial of
certiorari. 68
Justice Stevens expressed regret that the Court had expedited the
Breard case such that the final decision rested neither on briefs nor on
oral arguments.69 Although he had dissented from Breard on the basis
of procedure, in retrospect, Justice Stevens seemed convinced that he
should have aimed his dissent at the merits of the case. 70 Noting the
"obvious tension between the holding in Breard and the purpose of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention,"" he averred that the Court's
"manifestly unfair"" application of procedural default in Article 36
cases indicated faithlessness to the Constitution's clause that
incorporated treaties into the "supreme Law of the Land." 73
Justice Breyer's comparatively dispassionate dissent, on the other
hand, recognized the issues raised by each party and suggested a
judicial itch to address and resolve those issues. Hinting strongly that
the authoritative voice in interpreting the VCCR might belong
exclusively to the ICJ. Justice Breyer recommended deferring a
decision on Torres's pelition until after the ICJ passed judgment on
Mexico's SUit. 74
More than fifty separate criminal cases involving alleged VCCR
violations against Mexican nationals, including Torres, comprised
Mexico's basis for the ICJ action. 75 Several of the defendants had
66 Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
67 Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States), 2004 I.e.l.
12,17 (Mar. 31).
'" 540 U.S. at 1035 (Stevens, J.); Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. t035 (2003)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).




73 /d. at 1035 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
74 Id..
75 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.e.I. 12, 13
(Mar. 31).
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received death sentences, and the ICJ again ordered that the United
States refrain from carrying out those sentences until it had adjudicated
Mexico's VCCR claim." In keeping with its task of resolving disputes
between nations, the Court focused on the rights and obligations of one
nation to another.
In a long and exhaustive judgment, the ICJ identified two major
points of contention in interpreting Article 36 of the VCCR: (I) which
party should bear the burden of establishing the defendants' citizenship
in the IeJ case, and (2) how to define "without delay" as it occurs in
Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR77 As to the first question, the Court
found that Mexico, which held the most records concerning the
defendants, should establish for the ICJ which defendants held Mexican
citizenship and which defendants held dual or United States
citizenship.78
With regard to the second question, the Court found that the
obligations to advise the defendant of his rights and to notify his
consulate "without delay" arose at the point when officials first
suspected that the person in custody might not be a United States
citizen. 79 After searching available records for some indication of what
the VCCR's drafters intended by the phrase "without delay," the Court
determined that while the phrase did not require immediate action upon
a suspicion that the person in custody was a foreign national, it did
require prompt action so that the foreign consulate could provide
meaningful assistance. 80
However, again, the Court imposed no sanctions. After finding
that the United States had breached its duties, the Court merely
acknowledged the United States' ongoing efforts to improve
compliance with Article 36" and exhorted the United States to review
and reconsider the defendants' cases,1l2
An extensive separate opinion by Judge Sepulveda noted that the
appropriate remedy for a VCCR notice violation lay not in restitution
but in a meaningful review and reconsideration of both sentence and
"Id.atI7.
77 Id. at 40.
78 Id. at 41.
79 Id. at 49.
80 Id.
81 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U,S.), 2004 I.e.l. 12,73
(Mar. 31).
" Id. at 72.
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conviction. R3 Specifically, he found that, because the courts of the
United States continued to apply procedural default to notice arguments
made under the VCCR even after the LaGrand judgment, judicial
review in the United States was neither "meaningful" nor "effective."84
Evidencing its impatience with the United States' apparent refusal to
depart from the procedural default rule, Judge Sepulveda threatened "to
recover the concept of 'juridical restitution' ... [which may include]
'rescinding or reconsideration of an administrative or judicial measure
unlawfully adopted in respect of the person or property of a
foreigner. ,,,K5
Within a year of the Avena decision, the United States withdrew
its support of the Optional Protocol that seated jurisdiction over VCCR
disputes with the ICJ. 86
Medellin and a Sidestep
Following the IC)'s decision in Avena, VCCR cases appeared in
the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, with one
Fifth Circuit case sparking a heated debate within the Supreme Court. R3
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court considered the case of
Jose Emesto Medellin, a Mexican national convicted in Texas state
court of the gang rape and murder of two girls, a capital offense." In
predictable form, the defendant alleged a VCCR Article 36 violation in
his federal habeas petition, relying for authority on the IC)'s then-brand
new opinion in Avena89 and President Bush's memorandum in response
to Avena. 90 The Court briefly pondered its own relationship to the ICJ,
83 Id. at 120-21.
84 Id. at 124.
" Id at 124-25.
86 Charles Lane, u.s. Quits Pact Used in Capita! Cases: Foes ~fDeath
Penalty Cite Access to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpostcom/wp-dyn/articles/A21981-2005Mar9.html.
87 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); Darby v. Hawk-Sawyer, 405
F.3d 942 (11th Cif. 2005); Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2005) available at 2005 WL 2292526;
and Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005).
"Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005).
89 Jd.
90 ld. at 663. The Court quoted the presidential memorandum as stating
that the "United States would discharge its international obligations under the
Avena judgment by 'having State courts give effect to the [ICI} decision in
accordance with general principles of comity .... ,,' [d. (quoting George W.
Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005)).
2006] ARTICLE 36: VIENNA CONVENTION DILEMA III
noting as the two issues under consideration lIwhether a federal court is
bound by the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that United
States courts must reconsider petitioner Jose Medellin's claim for relief
under the Vielllla Convention on Consular Relations ... without regard
to procedural default doctrines" and "whether a federal court should
give effect, as a matter of judicial comity and unifonn treaty
interpretation, to the leI's judgment.,,91 However, even as it identified
these questions, the Court deftly skirted answering either of them.
Offering a handful of procedural reasons why it might rule against
Medellin, a divided Court dismissed his federal petition in favor of the
new slate habeas petition he had filed four days before oral argument. 92
In a scathing dissenl, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued that the questions at hand were too
compelling and too likely to recur in the future 10 ignore merely
because the defendant "might" receive some relief in his new state
petition. 9J The dissenl pointed 10 problems the Courl might have
resolved definitively had it chosen to consider the merits of Medellin's
case. 94 An exasperated dissent suggests the Court was avoiding the
merits altogether by pointing out potential procedural snags not raised
by the parties. 95 It appears that the dissent, while limiting an
immediate decision to the Certificate of Appealability, viewed this case
as a doorway to judicial review of far more expansive issues, such as
proper construction of Article 36 and remedies for the United States'
repeated failure to comply with treaty obligations.96
While the Court's approach to this case appears a little weak-
kneed and the dissent's equally rash, Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion l joined by Justice Scalia, restores perspective to the overall
decision. Recognizing the Court's division, the concurring opinion
analyzed the divergent paths chosen by the Court and by the dissenl,
finding that the dissent's fervor to address the problems and to remand
the case for further proceedings would likely result in confusion, wilh
duplicative proceedings in slale and federal courts, and could
jeopardize the defendant's case." Justice Ginsburg wenl on to note
91 Id. at 661-62.
92 !d.
93 Id. at 673 (emphasis in original),
94 Medellin v. Dretke. 544 U.S. 660, 673 (2005).
95 Id at 681-82.
96 ld at 689.
97 Id at 669-72.
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that, should the defendant appeal the state proceedings, the Court
would have jurisdiction to revisit this case at a later date. 9l!
Bustillo and Sanchez-Llamas
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in and joined together
two more cases asserting notice violations under the VeeR. Although
the questions presented in each of these cases differ, each of these cases
is distinguishable from its predecessors on a very important point. The
Court's willingness to consider the merits of these two cases brings
hope that it is poised to answer some of the longstanding questions
concerning rights and obligations under the VCCR.
In Bustillo v. Johnson, a Honduran national stood accused of
murder. 99 Mario Bustillo was arrested, tried, and convicted of
murdering James Merry with a baseball bat behind a local Popeye's
restaurant, an act he denied. IOU At Bustillo's trial, the sole issue was
whether Bustillo or another man known at that time only as "Sirena"
had swung the bat. 101 Despite its obligation to "disclose exculpatory
material," 102 the State withheld multiple articles of evidence that would
have cleared Bustillo and identified Sirena as the killer. 103 Lacking this
crucial police evidence, Bustillo defended himself primarily on the
basis of eyewitness testimony that State witnesses rebutted;
consequentl6:; his attempt to inculpate Sirena and exculpate himself at
trial failed. I
As in other cases, Bustillo claimed on federal habeas petition that
United States authorities never advised him of his VCCR rights. IllS
Unique to this case, Bustillo credibly argued that the VCCR violation
prejudiced his defense and that, while he learned of his rights under the
VCCR after his criminal trial, he first asserted those rights during the
appeals process, prior to any petition for post-conviction relief. 106
9S Id. at 671-72.
99 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Bustillo v. Johnson, _ U.S. _
(2006) (No. 05-51), available al http://abanel.org/pub1iced/preview/briefs/pdfs/
05-06/05-5I_Petitioner.pdf[hereinafter Bustillo v. Johnson Brief].
100Id.
\OIId. at 6.
102 [d. at 6, n.I.
103 The withheld evidence included detectives' notes that memorialized
both a police encounter with a red-stained SirenalOsorto and an eyewitness
account of Sirena "with his 'bat cocked."I [d. at 6, 8.
104 Id. at 8.
105 Bustillo v. Johnson Brief, supra note 99, at 2.
106 [d. at 8-9.
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During the course of his appeals and habeas petitions, Bustillo acquired
from the State and developed with the help of the Honduran consulate
the evidence implicating Sirena, whose real name is Julio C. Osorto.107
The police records he acquired enabled him to obtain a photob'Taph of
Osorto through the Honduran consulate 10' and Osorto's secretly
videotaped confession to the crime, in which Osorto described the
murder and acknowledged Bustillo's wrongful conviction."l9 The
Honduran consulate also supplied Bustillo with evidence that
corroborated another witness's testimony that Sirena/Osorto had fled
the United States for Honduras the day after the murder. llo However,
the Virginia courts held that Bustillo had procedurally defaulted on his
VCCR claims and that new evidence was inappropriate upon habeas
petition, and they affinned his conviction. III
It is likely due to the Honduran consulate's extensive assistance
in developing Bustillo's theory that Sirena/Osorto committed the
murder that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. Eight
years ago, when Breard failed to persuade the Supreme Court to grant
relief based on his VCCR claim, the Court noted that a successful
habeas petition would prove that the VCCR violation had prejudiced
the defendant's criminal trial. 112 Bustillo has now cleared that hurdle
and gained the attention of the Court. However, although the facts
Bustillo has developed appear compelling, the question before the
Court in his case is still procedural at heart:
Whether, contrary to the International Court of Justice's
interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations [citation omitted], state courts may refuse to
consider violations of Article 36 of that treaty because of a
procedural bar or on the ground that the treaty does not
create individually enforceable rights. 113
In Bustillo's favor is his strong evidence of innocence. Where
previous defendants have had little evidence to recommend review of
their cases, Bustillo now has police records and the preserved
107 Jd.
108 Id. at 10.
109 [d. at 9.
110 Id. at 8.
III Bustillo v. Johnson Brief, supra note 99, at 9.
112 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 37t, 378 (t998).
113 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sanchez-Llama;; v. Oregon, _ U.S. _
(2006) (No. 04-10566), available at http://abanct.org/publiced/previewlbricfs/p
dfs/05-06/04-1 0566]etitioner.pdf [hereinafter Sanchez-Llamas Brief].
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confession of another man to underscore the injustice apparently done
to him.
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon l police arrested a Mexican national
for shooting at officers who were responding to a call for assistance
from the roommates of Sanchez-Llamas's girlfriend. 114 The
roommates reported that Sanchez-Llamas had "threatened them with a
gun.nllS Officers arriving on the scene found a "heavily intoxicated"
Sanchez-Llamas hiding behind the residence. I I' The officers identified
themselves, ordered him to drop his weafon, and when he did not do
so, briefly exchanged gunfire with him. II Sanchez-Llamas eventually
gave himself up but failed to follow the officers' verbal direction to
drop to his knees. '" Because of this failure, four officers physically
subdued Sanchez-Llamas, punching him and beating him with a
flashlight. 119 During the course of the night, authorities learned that
Sanchez-Llamas possessed a very limited English proficiency. 120 They
administered his Miranda notice in both Spanish and English on two
separate occasions, including one time when Sanchez-Llamas was in
the hospital 1I1ying on a bed waiting to be x-rayed. II 121 Sanchez-Llamas
communicated with the officers during interrogation adequately to
convey his version of the night's events; however, his answers to
crucial questions often contradicted one another. 122 Sanchez-Llamas
never received notice of his rights under the VCCR. 123
The trial courts appear to have been a little bewildered by
Sanchez-Llamas's assertions of rights under the VCCR. In pre-trial
motions, Sanchez-Llamas argued that the court should suppress his
statements to police because the defendant's inebriation, fear of police,
and below-average language skills and intelligence prevented him from
understanding or knowingly waiving his right to counsel. 124 Defense
counsel also argued for suppression on the grounds that the police
obtained the defendant's statements "in violation of the Vienna
114 Petitioner's Brief refers to a call from "two roommates of respondent's
girlfriend" complaining about "respondent"; however, as Respondent in this





119 Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 113, at 3.
120 1d.
121 [d. at 4.
122 [d. at 4-6.
1231d. at 6.
124 [d.
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Convention and his right to due process." 125 The trial and appellate
courts declined to entertain Sanchez-Llamas's claim for relief under the
VCCR. Basing its analysis on an opinion from the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.'"
The two questions presented in Sanchez-Llamas's case speak
directly to the existence of an individually enforceable right and a
potential remedy for violation of that right:
1. Does Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations confer on a foreign national detained in the
United States individual rights of consular notification
and access enforceable in the courts of the United States
by that national?
2. Does the failure to advise a foreign national detained in
the United States of his rights under the Vienna
Convention result in the suppression of his statements to
police?127
Thus, in quite different procedural contexts, Bustillo's and Sanchez-
Llamas's cases present the same basic question: whether Article 36 of
the VCCR confers individually enforceable rights on foreign nationals.
Whereas Bustillo first raised his VCCR claim after being convicted and
consequently lost his appeals and state petition for habeas relief on the
basis of the procedural default doctrine, Sanchez-Llamas first raised his
VCCR claim prior to trial. He lost because the lower courts refused to
hear his VCCR argument and the Oregon Supreme Court declined to
recognize any individual rights under the VCCR.
On March 29, 2006, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
these two cases, starting with the defendants/petitioners, followed by
the two States, the United States government, and finally from Bustillo
on rebuttal.'Z' The Court examined those arguments from three
perspectives, including whether the VCCR created any individually
enforceable right; if so, who qualified as a competent authority under
the treaty to advise the defendant of that right; and the nature and
source of any remedy for a violation of that right.
125 Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 113, at 3.
126 Id. at 7. It should be noted that Oregon is in the Ninth Circuit, on the
opposite geographical end of the country from the First Circuit.
127 Id. at i.
128 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, _
U.S. _ (Nos. 04-10566 and 05·51), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral_argumcnts/argument_transcripts/04-1 0566.pdf [hereinafter Sanchez-
Llamas Oral Argument].
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Delving into the primary question of whether an individually
enforceable right exists, the Court recognized that treaties exist as
agreements between sovereigns and nonnally "[do not] confer
enforceable rights on individuals." 129 However, the justices appeared
to exhibit diverging views on this question, and on the question of
whether to follow the ICJ, from an early point. When Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged early in the proceedings that the ICJ had ruled that the
VCCR did indeed create an individual right, Justice Scalia almost
immediately undercut the international court's authority: "it ... does
not set forth propositions of law that are binding in future cases. If it's
not bound by its prior cases, I don't know why we should be." 130 In
addition, counsel for the United States government bluntly asserted that
the ICJ's interpretation of the treaty as creating individual rights was
"wrong." 131 In light of this argument and his attitude, it is unlikely that
Justice Scalia, at least, would find persuasive the fel's consistent
rulings on this matter or the United States' subscription to the Optional
Protocol that seated interpretive authority with the ICl
In surveying other signatory nations' approaches to the VCCR's
notice provision, the Court learned that while "[m]any" nations purport
to recognize a right, only eleven proactively advise defendants of the
right, and perhaps only two exclude evidence when authorities violate
that right. 132 However, counsel was unable to provide a detailed
description of how other nations remedy the problem, if they do so at
all. Although counsel for Bustillo asserted that the remedy of
excluding evidence originated in the treaty, Justice Souter's line of
questions eventuall~ led counsel to acknowledge that this remedy came
from domestic law 33 and that nsuppression is a creature of this Court's
authority, common law authority." ]]4
In evaluating who qualifies as a competent authority under the
treaty to advise a foreign national of any VCCR rights, the Court
considered three options: attorneys, judges, and police officers. The
Court devoted a great deal of time to its examination of the role of
counsel in VCCR cases, particularly because Bustillo's trial attorney
was personally familiar with the notice provisions of Article 36 and, as
a matter of strategy, declined to advise Bustillo of his right to consular
129 Id. at 5.
130Id. at 7.
131 Id. at 71.
132 Id. at 8.
133 Id at 10 15
134 S~nchez~L1~mas Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 14.
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contact. 135 Despite admitting that defense counsel is not "a competent
authority under the treaty for the purposes of notifying the accused," 136
the State in Bustillo's case nonetheless argued in favor of a new rule
laying the burden of VCCR notification on the defendant's attorney.
This approach would not only equate asserting a VCCR claim with
asserting a Miranda or Fourth Amendment violation, but would also
excuse the State from its failure to notify Bustillo of his rights. ll7 As a
result, where counsel failed to advise his client of the right to consular
contact, the defendant could further his case by claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Chief Justice noted that seating the burden
on defense counsel would create an incentive for counsel to refrain
from advising the defendant of his VCCR rights, resulting in an "ace in
the hole" for faining post-conviction review if the State failed to
provide notice. J8 In addition, the Court acknowledged, but did not
comment further, that an unrepresented defendant would automatically
suffer. 139
The Court also considered the possibility that judges and police
officers might carry the responsibility of ensuring defendants receive
notice. Consideration of the judge's role, however, was fleeting,
limited only to an inquiry of counsel for the State of Oregon as to the
State's attitude toward requiring state judges to enforce a federal
treaty.140 Far more telling were the Court's comments in response to
the State of Oregon's brief description of its ongoing efforts to ensure
treaty compliance by the police force. 141 The justices expressed no
small amount of frustration at the practical difficulties encountered by
law enforcement in ascertaining defendants' origins and administering
notice. 142
135 Id at 58.
136 1d. at 62.
137 !d. at 59.
1311 Jd. at 64.
[39 [d. at 19.
[40 Sanchez-Llamas Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 49 and 54.
1411d. at 51.
142 On counsel advising the Court that some defendants concealed their
origins, Justice Souter exclaimed, "You ask him what his name is. Why don't
you ask him whether he's an American citizen? Ifhe says no, say what country
are you a citizen of. I mean, I-I don't see the difficulty of that." ld. at 53.
Upon hearing about the State's extensive research into methods of
implementation, Justice Kennedy observed that "it's not like rocket science.
You've had study groups and everything. Well, you just tell the policemen give
them-give them the advice. End of case." Id. at 52.
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Should the Court detennine that an individually enforceable right
exists under the VeeR, the next question is whether a corresponding
remedy exists. Noting that neither the treaty nor customary
international law supplies a remedy, the Court focused on potential
remedies in domestic law. 143 With nods to the ICl'g exhortation to
provide a reasonable reconsideration of the case, 144 the Court explored
several possible remedies, including suppression of evidence, a
standalone cause of action, and review based on an assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In spite of Sanchez-Llamas's
arguments, the Court seemed unwilling to accept suppression of
evidence as the singular remedy, 145 particularly where no causal link
exists between the lack of notice and the evidence gained. 146 While not
embracing suppression, the Court also did not exclude it as always
inappropriate. The Court fleetingly considered the possibility that an
individual right might not stand alone but rather might depend on
another law to provide a cause of action. 147 Peppered throughout the
discussion and inextricably woven into the question of whether the
obligation to give notice lies with counsel is the possibility of gaining a
post-conviction review based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim would have to meet
the two-prong Strickland lest that requires deficient perfonnance and
prejudice. I" This approach seemed appealing to the justices, as it
comports with the Coun's prior ruling that a petitioner must support his
VCCR claim with an allegation of prejudice. However, Bustillo's
counsel explained that to date, courts had rejected ineffective assistance
claims based on VCCR violations by nature as "that category of treaty
violations that, if [pushed] ... to ineffective assistance, ... evaporate ...
,,149
Considering these two cases together provides the Supreme
Court with an unparalleled opportunity to conduct a meaningful, in-
depth examination of the individual rights question, both as it affects
substantive domestic law and treaty interpretation and as it interacts
with the procedural default doctrine. The Court may well address
Justice O'Connor's concerns from Medellin, this time unfettered by the
1431d. at 12.
144/d. at 14 and 31.
145/d. at 13-14, 19-20.
146 Sanchez-Llamas Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 13.
147 Id. at 83 (suggesting 42 U.S.c. § 1983 as an example).
I" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
149 Sanchez.Llamas Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 38.
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limitations of the Certificate of Appealability question and the
complications observed by Justice Ginsburg.
IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND FtNDlNG SOLUTIONS
The failure of United States officials to comply with the notice
provision of the treaty underlies each and every domestic case invoking
VCCR Article 36. Despite repeated assurances to the ICJ of future
compliance involving broadly distributed instructional publications and
education initiatives,150 the government has failed to eradicate non-
compliance, even from high-profile, capital cases. The primary
problem plaguing compliance efforts in general is confusion over
whose interpretation of the VCCR is authoritative. The ICJ, the
Supreme Court, and the governments of various countries all have
offered interpretations of the VCCR, but each entity appears to have
turned ifnot a deaf ear, at least a tin ear to the others.
The disparity in available interpretations of the treaty belies the
greater dilemma that underlies the simple procedural confusion. Its
noble purpose aside,151 the VCCR has done more to inflame the tension
between international and domestic law in the United States than
assuage it. Under the VCCR, member nations committed to bind their
domestic criminal justice systems to a wholly external international
agreement. However, in the case of the United States, this graft
appears to be failing, as the criminal justice system continually rejects
its international component. The question inevitably arises: where
compliance with a treaty demands procedural modifications to
domestic law, how should the United States resolve the tension
between international obligations and domestic law? On one hand, the
United States voluntarily committed itself to behave in certain ways
under a treaty with other sovereign nations and, under the Constitution,
that voluntary commitment became a part of United States law. The
United States' adherence to, or divergence from, its promises under the
treaty will likely affect its relations with its purported equals - the other
member nations of the VCCR. On the other hand, the United States
must respect its own long tradition of domestically generated laws.
Continuity in enforcing domestic law l particularly through uniform and
150 LaGrand Case (F.R.G v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 512-13 (June 27);
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.v. U,S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,60 (March
31).
lSI The stated purpose of the VeeR is to facilitate consular relations.
VCCR, supra note t, at 77.
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predictable procedures which apply to a variety of substantive areas,
ensures fairness in the judicial process.
Executive, Judicial, or Legislative Problem?
The two branches of United States government that have recently
addressed the nation's obligations under the VCCR appear to support
domestic concerns over international concerns. Given the Supreme
Court's deference to the procedural default rule and its corresponding
diminishment of VCCR notice obligations, to date, the Judicial branch
unsurprisingly has favored preserving the sanctity of domestic law,
The Executive branch, which itself entered the treaty some forty years
ago on behalf of the United States, also appears to favor domestic law
over international obligations, as evidenced by its withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol following the IC]'s decision in Avena, 152
This predilection for domestic law derives partly from the nature
and focus of these two governmental branches, The Supreme Court is,
by its nature, the ultimate interpreter of domestic law and bears the
burden of making treaty law work with common law and statutes.
Populated by professional jurists whose lifetime tenure on the Court
enables them to remain by the changing tides of political sentiment, the
Court is perhaps the most politically stable of the three branches of
government. Members of the Supreme Court aim to ensure that United
States law is constitutional, just, and unifonnly applied. By contrast,
the Executive branch undergoes upheaval, and often personnel changes,
every four years through the electoral process. This regular change of
administration promotes short-tenn fixes and self-serving decisions by
the executive branch rather than coordinated long-tenn solutions.
Members of the executive branch aim to lead the country well but also
to sustain their own employment. Despite differing motivations, in the
case of the VCCR, these two branches have both elevated domestically
generated procedure over treaty obligations.
This observation does not recommend that either the Executive
or the Judicial branch of the government is the ideal branch to resolve
the issue at hand. Once the treaty became effective, the duty of
reconciling domestically generated law and treaty law or choosing
between the two fell to the Judiciary. 153 However, as Justice Ginsburg
has hinted,154 given the broad spectrum of issues that spring from the
question of VCCR rights, the Judiciary may be ill-equipped to resolve
152 Lane, supra note 86.
153 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
154 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 668-69 (2005).
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this particular problem. While the Supreme Court could offer a narrow
but long-term procedural fix through case law as it did in Miranda v.
Arizona, "5 the Court has, up to this point, reviewed alleged VCCR
violations only as they opposed the procedural default rule. Only now
is the Court getting the opportunity to evaluate a VCCR violation on its
merits.
Should the Court find that the questions raised in connection with
an assertion of individual rights under the VCCR too broad for judicial
resolution, the proper branch to consider this problem is the Legislative
branch. While the Constitution has vested ultimate judicial power of
this country in the Supreme Court, giving the Court authority to
interpret the nation's treaties, 156 the Supreme Court has detennined that
Congress can override portions of treaties simply by passing laws that
conflict with the treaty provisions. 157 If Congress has the greater power
to override treaty provisions, then certainly it should be able to support
or clarify problematic provisions. Although the VCCR has been
deemed a self-executing treaty,'SH it should be evident that integrating
certain of its provisions into United States law has not proceeded
seamlessly. Congress has not rejected its provisions: on the contrary,
rather than enacting statutes that would supersede the VCCR, the
Legislature has approved a supportive regulation in the area of
immigration. 15' Ideally, Congress would enact a law of broader
application than the immigration regulation, requiring notice of VCCR
rights and designating some recourse for defendants who did not
receive the notice. This law, if enacted and carried out, would not only
bring the United States into compliance with the VCCR and protect
foreign defendants but, depending on the recourse Congress chose,
i55 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring law enforcement authorities to
advise arrcstees of specific rights). Although hailed by some as an important
protection for arrestees, to others Miranda represents an impermissible
Supreme Court foray into the area of legislation. See 384 U.S. at 524-26
(Clark, J.. dissenting) (favoring a legislative solution to the problem presented
over a judicial one).
'56 U.S. CONST. art. 1tI, cl. 1-2.
157 Reid v. Covert. 354 U.S. 1, 18 & n.34 (1957) (citing Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
15' Breard v. Pruett. 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
'59 8 C.F.R. ~ t236.I(e) (2006) (requiring that authorities provide
immigrants subject to deportation with notice of their rights to contact and
communicate with their consuls).
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might also satisfy the IC]'s request for provision of a meaningful
review. 160
Domestic or Internotional Solution?
In considering whether to enforce compliance with the VCCR's
notice requirement, United States authorities would do well to consider
international concerns as well as domestic concerns. From a practical
standpoint, lawmakers will naturally concern themselves with domestic
issues such as whether a law is constitutional, whether it conforms with
current law, whether it is logistically feasible, and whether it is
politically popular; justices will determine whether the law comports
with the Constitution. However, where a domestic law may impact on
compliance with a multilateral treaty such as the VCCR, it is also
important to consider any international ramifications tied to it. When
the United States enacts a law or the Supreme Court rules in a way that
impacts on its treaty obligations to other nations, those other nations
will evaluate that law or ruling to determine whether their treaty partner
is behaving as a good citizen in the world community. Support or
rejection of promises under the VCCR, which entails obligations not
only to the other sovereign states but also to their individual citizens,
will speak directly to the other member states about respect and trust.
A decision upholding voluntarily assumed treaty obligations will
suggest that the United States respects its peers as equals rather than as
subordinates. Similarly, a decision closing a common-law loophole
that has deprived foreign nationals of meaningful review of their cases
will suggest that the United States respects human rights. These
displays of respect, in turn, should engender trust that the United States
will keep its word under the VCCR as well as under future treaties.
A brief comparison of two well-worn philosophies of
international relations bears up this community-conscious approach.
Nearly four hundred years ago, Hugo Grotius envisioned an idyllic
world in which a community of sovereign states flourished because
they recognized and respected their own interdependence. Each
adhered to its promises to the others in both wartime and peacetime
because "there is no state so powerful that it may not some time need
the help of others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to
ward off the forces of many foreign nations united against iLnl61
160 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.v. U.S.), 2004 I.e.]. 12,
120-21 (March 3t).
161 HUGO GRonus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, 17 (Kelsey trans.
1913).
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Conversely, "the state which transgresses the laws of nature and of
nations cuts away ... the bulwarks which safeguard its own future
peace,tll62 Opposing Grotius' theory of a morally unified community
of states, Machiavelli's famous pardble of the Prince presupposed not
that states were wholly independent of one another, but lhat they had
the potential to be faithless and self-serving in their dealings with one
another. Because of this presumed dishonesty, Machiavelli
admonished that:
[Aj prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing
it would be against his interest, and when the reasons
which made him bind himself no longer exist. Ifmen were
all good, this precept would not be a good one; but as they
are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you
are not bound to keep faith with them. 163
Each of these philosophies is built upon an imperfect foundation,
and the truth likely lies somewhere between them. Both Grotius and
Machiavelli assumed that sovereign states would exhibit a constancy of
nature in their quest for self-preservation - that, like individual people,
slates would behave either morally or selfishly toward one another -
and that their relations with one another would develop in accordance
with that constant nature. However, in the United Nations, modem
society appears to anticipate both types of behavior in international
relations: not only does it embrace multilateral treaties and agreements
and encourage discourse and unity among the nations, but it employs
judicial and security arms to check misdeeds.
The Ie}'s Role
In determining how to address the apparent conflict between
domestic law and the VCCR, the United States would do well to
remember its own image as a world citizen. The United States
withdrew its support of the Optional Protocol after the IC)'. judgment
in the Avena case, complaining that "fewer than thirty percent of the
signatories of the Vienna Convention had agreed to the Optional
Protocol." \64 By withdrawing from the Optional Protocol with the cries
of death penalty opponeots still in the air, the United States arguably
demonstrated a distrust of the ICl If, as it appears from Avena, the
United States worries that the IC) will use VeCR Article 36 as an
162 [d. at 16.
163 N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES, 64 (Lerner ed.
1950).
164 Lane, supra note 86.
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avenue for imposing anti-death penalty attitudes on the United States,
the distrust may well be unfounded. Despite examining over fifty cases
involving criminal defendants, the IC] remained detached and focused
on resolving the contractual disputes between Mexico and the United
States by interpreting the language and intent of the VCCR. In fact, the
Court specifically noted that "[w]hether or not the Vienna Convention
rights are human rights is not a matter that this Court need decide.u165
In the Avena opinion, the IC] explored contractual issues, such as the
purpose behind VCCR Article 36, "which [was] to enable 'meaningful
consular assistance' and the safeguarding of the vulnerability of foreign
nationals in custody."I66 On the other hand, a worry that the IC] may
eventually impose sanctions for continued non-compliance may be
well-founded.
The United States should not allow its withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol to render it deaf to the considered judgments already
rendered by the IC]. As the judicial branch of the United Nations, with
limited power and a diverse membership that should promote just
results, the IC] is uniquely well suited to guide member nations in
uniformly interpreting the VCCR. Without an authoritative interpreter,
practical questions about the VCCR will remain unanswered. Nations
and courts will continue to apply the VCCR's provisions unevenly or
not at all. Without a respected nonpartisan voice providing answers,
questions concerning whether the VCCR created any individual rights,
what rights they are and in whom they reside, how to enforce them, and
what remedies are appropriate will continue to vex trial judges and bog
down dockets.
Diverging Attitudes and Inconsistent Case Law
Despite the fact that both the Optional Protocol and the rules of
the IC] required it to accept IC] decisions as binding, the United States
has yet to honor the IC]'s interpretations of the VCCR. 167 However,
under pressure from within the Supreme Court as well as from outside
it, the law is beginning to change. In Torres and Medellin, members of
the Supreme Court demonstrated a growing dissatisfaction with the
inequitable and unjust application of the procedural default rule.
Congress enacted an immigration statute that reflects the notice
provisIOn of VCCR Article 36, codifying the contact and
165 2004 I.e.J. at 61.
166Id. at 47.
167 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 682-685 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting),
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communication rights of immigrants facing deportation. 16l! Foreign
nationals' arguments have begun to probe the courts' attitudes toward
VCCR violations by exploring alternative remedies for Article 36
breaches. 169
While it is true that the law already exists in the form of the
treaty itself and the constitutional provision that gives treaties
constitutional status, the plain fact is that the law, as currently
configured, has failed. The various courts are not the appropriate venue
for rectifying the problem. While it is true that the Supreme Court
stands poised to clarify the judiciary's role in resolving VCCR claims,
buttressing the current system of laws guarantees no better result than
relying on it as-is.
The role of lawmaker properly belongs to Congress. Having
already ensured that immigrants subject to deportation have the right
receive notice and communicate with their consuls, 170 Congress should
stride more confidently into the broader venue of criminal law and
enact legislation that will ensure future conformity with the VCCR.
The United States should ensure that upcoming changes in the law are
consistent both with one another and with prior decisions by accepting
the IC]'s expertise in interpreting the VCCR.
CONCLUSION
United States authorities' failure to honor the notice provision of
Article 36 of the VCCR is a correctable and preventable problem.
United States courts disagree on aspects of defendants' VCCR
arguments, ranging from whether the procedural default rule should
properly apply to late VCCR claims; to which rights, if any, flow from
the VCCR and to whom; to which remedies are available to injured
parties. While withdrawing from the Optional Protocol may have
spared the United States the continuing reproach of the IC] and
possible future sanctions therefrom, that relief fails to resolve the
disputes that will continue to grow out of non-compliance. A practical
solution to the problem must eventually come from Congress. An
1611 Rosales v. Bureau oflmmigration and Customs Enforcement, 2005 WL
2292526 (5th Cir. (Tex.)) (explaining VeeR's notice provision now codified in
8 C.F.R. §1236.1 (e), but habeas relief still requires showing of demonstrable
prejudice).
169 In 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the
VeCR creates in the individual a private right of action in tort for violations of
Article 36. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7lh Cir. 2005).
170 8 C.F.R. § 1236. t(e).
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infonned solution should consider and incorporate the IC)'s prior
judgments.
